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Introduction
Today, anyone who is under the impression that insurance is a luxury that is only 
available in wealthy countries of the global North is faced with a multitude of 
examples to the contrary. Not only are traditional lines of insurance business, like 
life and health insurance, growing rapidly in much of the global South, new forms 
of insurance harnessing powerful geospatial monitoring and modelling technolo-
gies are increasingly being deployed to offer Southern governments insurance for 
hazards such as droughts, floods, cyclones and diseases. It is hoped that such coverage 
will secure development gains. But has the growth of such tools actually reduced 
uncertainties? So far, the evidence is mixed.
The actuarial technologies of the insurance industry have long been central to 
the development of methods to assess uncertainty. These methods yield quanti-
fiable – and thus priceable and transferable – risk. Amid the proliferating uncer-
tainties of climate change and the growing cost of disasters, the impulse to insure 
across more geographic and hazard domains has grown. Insurers and multilateral 
institutions now explicitly seek to narrow what they call the ‘global protection 
gap’ – the difference between total economic losses and insured losses (Lloyd’s 2018; 
Swiss Reinsurance 2015). Development institutions and insurers have advanced 
several strategies to occupy this protection gap, which is widest in countries of 
the global South. They have advocated insurance- linked tools such as catastrophe 
bonds, promoted the application of insurance- based logic to new domains like pan-
demic diseases and launched insurance pools at new multi-country scales.
Yet almost none of these instruments look like what we imagine as traditional 
insurance arrangements. The large majority of these instruments are ‘parametric’ 
products, in which payouts are triggered by measured or modelled environmental 







transfer tools are increasingly popular responses in development practice. It then 
argues that this embrace can paradoxically proliferate uncertainties when insurance 
contracts fail to pay out, illustrated with reference to drought insurance in Malawi 
and pandemic insurance in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The chapter closes 
by envisioning how insurance might be refashioned from a ‘technology of hubris’ 
to a ‘technology of humility’ (Jasanoff 2003), suggesting some principles for more 
relational deployments of insurance that could begin to recuperate its promise as a 
technique of mutual solidarity and sustainable risk- sharing.
The impulse to insure
There are both economic and political reasons why insurance – and disaster risk 
finance more broadly – have become major domains for development intervention. 
Given that many Southern countries have long since been compelled to remove 
social safety nets and market controls as a condition for continuing to receive loans 
from international institutions, there is often little to cushion their populations, 
leaving them especially vulnerable to shocks. An early World Bank piece advancing 
the framework of weather risk management identified the processual link between 
micro and macro: ‘Ultimately, the precariousness of farmers and producers translates 
into macroeconomic vulnerability’ (Hess et al. 2002: 296). Multilateral institutions 
now identify disaster shocks as a major impediment to a country’s macroeconomic 
stability and its ability to maintain the welfare of its citizens (Cummins and Mahul 
2009). Disasters constitute a fiscal ‘squeeze’: while a government’s unbudgeted relief 
expenditures rise, its future revenue- raising capacity deteriorates as household assets 
are lost and incomes decline. Declining revenues impair a government’s capacity to 
pay off existing loans or issue bonds, forcing it to take on more emergency debt. 
Such dynamics are not just the concern of international financial institutions: activist 
organisations such as the Jubilee Debt Campaign have recently argued that climate 
change is intensifying these patterns, warning of ‘climate debt traps’ resulting from 
post- disaster emergency borrowing, such as the loan Mozambique took following 
Cyclone Idai in 2019 (Sauer 2019).
Insurance – and particularly the global insurance industry – occupies pride of 
place in the push to move from ex post to ex ante financing arrangements. This is 
partly a result of scalar relations. The difficulty of some of the thorniest problems 
in the field of development – large ‘natural’ disasters, climate change impacts and 
pandemic disease among them – is that they are spatially and temporally covariant. 
While everyday coping systems might work to buffer people from quotidian indi-
vidual shocks, they are overwhelmed when many people in a region suffer from 
the same event at the same time. Likewise, government funds, if they exist at all, are 
quickly exhausted, particularly in countries with small economies. For instance, the 
Solomon Islands has no disaster reserves, and average annual disaster losses consume 
6.5 per cent of Vanuatu’s GDP (World Bank 2015: 9).
In these contexts, the large and globally diversified pools of capital held by 
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development sector’s approach. In the absence of a multilateral development 
insurer,1 it is the reinsurance industry that can quickly dispatch the quantities of 
post- disaster liquidity required. This industry has also systematically cultivated 
actuarial and modelling expertise and positioned itself as a consummate provider 
of risk management solutions. Its operational framework dovetails with Western 
donors’ mandates to make aid more auditable and economically efficient, and to 
deploy market- based solutions and private sector capital to bridge financing gaps 
(Mawdsley 2015).
Since the mid- 2010s, cash- strapped humanitarian and aid agencies have faced 
ballooning numbers of crisis- affected populations, exacerbated by ongoing con-
flict, extreme weather events linked to climate change and increasingly uncertain 
funding streams from isolationist Western donors. This precarious situation has 
driven an emphasis on the dollar- for- dollar efficiency of aid and objective cri-
teria for its disbursement. This aligns with an insurance- based approach to model-
ling, pricing and contractually managing risks. Formal insurance or insurance- like 
instruments require contractual specifications that delineate who is responsible 
for post- disaster transfers, for what and in what circumstances. Such specificity 
holds obvious appeal for improving welfare given the delays and chaos of ordinary 
humanitarian response – what Dunn (2012) terms ‘adhocracy’.
In theory, the process of deciding what insurance coverage to purchase should 
encourage pre- disaster risk assessment, management and response planning. The 
pre- defined terms of insurance contracts should secure funding for response and 
delineate post- disaster responsibilities (Clarke and Dercon 2016). In turn, the 
automaticity of payouts based on environmental measures should secure timely 
financing for urgent needs and facilitate disbursement from a distance, while trans-
parency about payout conditions should reduce perennial donor concerns about aid 
leakage and corruption. This, at least, is the vision.
In practice, many applications of insurance technologies have demonstrated the 
hazards of what science studies scholar Sheila Jasanoff (2003: 238) calls ‘technolo-
gies of hubris’. By this, she refers to technologies that leverage science ‘to facilitate 
management and control even in areas of high uncertainty … [which] achieve their 
power through claims of objectivity and a disciplined approach to analysis’ (ibid.). 
Despite the power of these technologies, their advocates are often overconfident of 
their accuracy and rigour, and blind to forms of uncertainty that fall outside their 
framing assumptions. They tend to invoke the objectivity of their expertise in order 
to avoid political debate and calls for social accountability. The cases of drought and 
pandemic insurance, to which the chapter turns next, suggest that parametric insur-
ance is no stranger to the hazards of technological hubris.
The political economy of basis risk: blame and liability
To understand how uncertainty becomes a transferred political and economic 
object we need to grasp the logic of assembly behind parametric insurance tools. In 








payout made is at least ostensibly proportional to that loss. But indemnification 
is expensive, and requires constant work with regards to surveillance and data 
gathering. In contrast, most disaster risk insurance contracts now on offer are built 
on parametric logic. In parametric contracts, payouts are determined by the value of 
one or more measured environmental variable – a parameter like rainfall or pas-
ture greenness – that can be monitored at a distance. Parametric logic posits scalar 
correspondence between selected variables at easily observed scales, and actual 
losses at less easily observed scales. Contract designers inevitably make tremendous 
simplifications and exclusions when postulating this correspondence.
By definition, parametric contracts must abstract from contextual conditions, 
setting standardised proxies that can be efficiently applied to determine payouts. 
These technical processes of simplification, exclusion and decontextualisation have 
allowed insurance to be offered for places and perils previously deemed too unre-
munerative and risky for traditional insurance to operate. But these abstractions 
have generated their own new sets of uncertainties.
Most prominently, parametric design inevitably leaves those insured holding 
‘basis risk’. This refers to the risk of a discrepancy between the measures and models 
that determine payouts, on the one hand, and events on the ground, on the other. 
Even traditional indemnity insurance carries some basis risk: those insured typically 
have some ‘deductible’ amount of losses they must self- fund first, and claims can be 
denied if losses were caused by a contractually- excluded event (Muir- Wood 2017). 
Indeed, traditional insurers regularly make legal recourse to carefully constructed 
contractual definitions of harm and limits to liability in order to avoid paying 
indemnities (e.g. Baker 1994).
But basis risk for parametric insurance is of a different nature. One- to- one 
indemnification for losses is never promised. Payout determinations can be made 
without the insurer conducting any on- the- ground loss assessment with insured 
parties. A great deal then rests on the accuracy of the measures and models selected 
as proxies. Yet insured parties are rarely familiar with how well these proxies cor-
respond to their experience (or not), and often lack the actuarial skills to assess 
a contract’s reliability. Compounding the problem of proxy accuracy, catastrophe 
insurance coverage poses a more general problem. Unlike insurance for more 
quotidian events, catastrophe insurance is a ‘credence good’, where the irregular 
and infrequent temporality of loss events makes it difficult for buyers to assess the 
quality of the product before purchase. Learning takes place after premiums have 
been paid, when those insured see how an actual contract performs in comparison 
to their expectations (Clarke and Wren- Lewis 2013).
Drought insurance
Several countries insured by the African Risk Capacity2 drought insurance pro-
gramme have learned retrospectively about the limitations of the coverage they 
purchased. Organisationally housed within the African Union, ARC brings sover-
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by global reinsurers. ARC’s design is routinely championed as a path- breaking 
example, leveraging satellite data and regional solidarity to finance drought disaster 
response (UNFCCC 2017). The risk pool is capitalised by participating countries’ 
premiums, alongside interest- free equity from the UK and German development 
agencies. Payouts are triggered based on estimates of the number of drought- 
vulnerable people requiring relief, as modelled by ARC’s proprietary software, 
Africa RiskView. If triggered, ARC payouts must be used to fund the member’s 
pre- approved contingency plan for relief operations.
A great deal rests on the accuracy of the model’s estimated number of drought- 
vulnerable people. Africa RiskView constructs a complex causal chain to arrive 
at this number. It feeds satellite- based rainfall estimates into agronomic models of 
reference crops; shortfalls are then compared with pre- existing analyses of food 
security and population vulnerability to generate an estimate of the maximum 
number of people affected by a drought event. Member countries customise their 
insurance contracts to trigger a payout when a certain threshold number is reached.
In 2015, Malawi became the first southern African country to join the ARC 
pool of seven total members, paying US$4.7 million in premiums from its treasury 
for drought insurance cover. In March 2016, the Malawian government declared 
a drought emergency. Rains had failed at a critical time for the staple maize crop, 
and the stress was compounded by extremely high temperatures. Households’ food 
stores and assets were already depleted by the previous season’s droughts, floods 
and high food prices, stemming partly from an ongoing El Niño event (e- Pact 
2017). In June, ARC announced that Malawi’s drought insurance contract had not 
triggered a payout. Its model estimated the size of the drought- affected population 
at just 21,000 people. Meanwhile, a joint assessment by the government and aid 
organisations put the number at 6.5 million people (ActionAid 2017).
Though the biggest drivers of this staggering discrepancy are still subject to 
debate, poor data and poor model specification both played a part. Initially, ARC 
blamed the underestimate on the fact that Malawi had selected a long- cycle maize 
variety as the model’s agronomic reference crop, while the majority of Malawi’s 
farmers had recently switched to planting a short- cycle hybrid variety that was 
catastrophically damaged by cessation of rains after planting. Because the reference 
crop was chosen by government teams presumed to be knowledgeable about their 
country’s agricultural sector and its vulnerabilities, ARC deflected responsibility 
for the discrepancy to the Malawian government. Yet a later ground- based survey 
and model assessment found that both short- and long- maturing varieties of maize 
suffered similar drought impacts, suggesting that the model would have performed 
poorly even with the correct reference crop (e- Pact 2017:  33– 34). The likely 
greater problems lay in the model’s parameters: it did not account for the impacts 
of high temperatures on plant evapotranspiration and water stress, or the timing of 
dry spells during a crop’s growth cycle (ibid.). After seven months of consultations, 
donor pressure and international media scrutiny, ARC’s Board of Directors for-
mally approved a policy exception and agreed to disburse US$8.1 million to resolve 







emergency declaration, Malawians finally received ARC- funded relief in the form 
of legumes for household consumption.
Though ARC adjusted its model following the Malawi crisis, its problems did 
not end there. Africa RiskView again did not trigger a payout for a 2017 drought 
in Mauritania, despite dire conditions on the ground. A  ground- truthing team 
suggested the discrepancy stemmed from inaccurate rainfall data, poor assumptions 
in the agronomic model and the strikingly invalid assumption that farmers would 
have the resources to replant following failed rains (ARC Agency 2017). Again 
ARC’s board approved an exception and made an extra- contractual payout (ARC 
Agency 2018).
Pandemic bonds
No such exceptions to policy were possible when the World Bank’s first pan-
demic bond failed to trigger a payout in July 2019. That month, the World Health 
Organization declared the Ebola virus outbreak that began in 2018 in the eastern 
DRC a ‘Public Health Emergency of International Concern’ (WHO 2019). By this 
time, it was already the second largest Ebola outbreak in recorded history, respon-
sible for more than 1,500 deaths.
Following donors’ abysmally slow response to the 2014– 2016 Ebola outbreak in 
West Africa, the World Bank developed the Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility 
in consultation with the WHO. The PEF is intended to disburse surge financing to 
enable rapid responses to ‘infectious disease outbreaks before they take on pandemic 
proportions’ (World Bank 2018a: 4).3 Unlike ARC, where countries must self- select 
into the risk pool and pay an insurance premium, the PEF coverage automatically 
applies to all countries eligible for assistance from the World Bank’s International 
Development Association lending arm, without requiring any premium payment.4 
While it includes a ‘cash window’ for early donor support, the PEF’s signal innov-
ation is an ‘insurance window’ that draws down private investments made in a 
US$425 million catastrophe bond (Erikson 2019). An insurance payout for relief 
efforts is triggered if three major conditions are met: reports from the WHO con-
firm at least 250 total deaths; a third- party model deems rates of disease transmission 
to be growing over a sustained period and the disease spreads across borders resulting 
in at least 20 deaths in a second country (World Bank 2018a).
The requirement for geographical spread disqualified the Ebola epidemic in the 
DRC from triggering PEF’s insurance window. Though several Ebola deaths were 
confirmed in Uganda and feared in Rwanda and Tanzania, the count never reached 
20 in a second country. As medical anthropologist Susan Erikson (2019) notes, the 
PEF’s emphasis on the transparency and exactitude of disease counts ignores the 
vastly uncertain conditions under which disease data are collected: often by free-
lance enumerators and irregularly paid health workers hired to travel vast distances in 
dangerous conditions, and possibly denied access to villages. Recent violent attacks 
on health workers in the DRC underscore the ongoing precarity of the counting 
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conditions were actually met in the DRC and neighbouring countries, or that an 
error of measurement prevented a payout. Rather, the contractual criteria set a high 
enough bar – confirmed deaths and cross- border spread and growth rate – that it 
may well be the case that not all were met at the same time. It is impossible to know. 
Meanwhile, investors in the PEF catastrophe bond lost none of their principal, and 
continued to receive interest payments. Critics have heaped opprobrium on the 
World Bank for its role in designing the unscathed bond (Garrett 2019; Jonas 2019), 
and public health scholars suggested its conditions would have generated a payout 
for only two events since 2006 (Brim and Wenham 2019). Indeed the PEF bond 
did not trigger its US$195 million payout for COVID-19 until late April 2020, 
when this chapter was already in press (World Bank 2020).
Uncertain liability
ARC’s and PEF’s recent experiences suggest new domains of uncertainty introduced 
by insurance tools. In Malawi, bad data and poor model specifications led ARC to 
underestimate the actual extent of drought and its impact on farmers. Rather than 
introducing automaticity and timeliness to drought relief funding, the ARC contract 
gave rise to dispute, blame and delay. In the DRC, the bond’s activation criteria legally 
prevented the World Bank from drawing down investors’ funds despite the raging epi-
demic (Erikson and Johnson 2020). Rather than delivering capital market funds for 
public health emergencies, the coverage gave rise to befuddlement and recrimination.
In both cases there is a political economy of basis risk and liability. Contractual 
structures designed to preserve tight control over payouts are necessary in order 
to secure reinsurance cover or capital market investments. Both reinsurers and 
investors demand surety that their capital will only be depleted under specific 
conditions. Firms model the likelihood of these conditions transpiring in order 
to price contracts, estimate total exposures and hedge portfolios. When basis risk 
events occur, reinsurers and investors are largely unaffected – although reinsurers 
may suffer reputational damage from being associated with a product that did not 
pay out when public opinion deems it should have.
Who then is liable? In Malawi and Mauritania, ARC’s governing board even-
tually approved exceptions to policy to allow the compensatory payouts. In both 
cases, ARC’s reinsurers did not object, because the payouts (US$8.1 million and 
US$2.1 million, respectively) were small enough that the reinsurance coverage was 
not activated. The funds came out of ARC’s risk pool, co- owned by German and 
British government aid agencies and ARC’s African member states. Ultimately, it 
was governments and their taxpayers who shouldered the exceptional payments.
Unlike ARC, PEF’s catastrophe bond cannot permit post hoc exceptions, as it is 
legally bound by the terms of the prospectus circulated to investors. If an epidemic 
does not meet the bond’s activation criteria, but still meets minimum epidemio-
logical thresholds, governments or responding humanitarian agencies can request 
funds from the PEF’s ‘cash window’, funded by German and Australian develop-






for the 2019 Ebola epidemic in the DRC, and was empty by the time COVID-19 
emerged as a new threat in 2020. Again, it was governments and their taxpayers 
who shouldered the cash payments.
Indeed, there is a good argument to be made for wealthy governments bearing 
such costs. But this reflects a different political economy of liability than one in 
which capital from private reinsurers and investors is truly leveraged to narrow the 
‘global protection gap’. In the cases of ARC and PEF, the reinsurer and investor 
capital underwriting these products remained intact in the midst of severe droughts 
and a historic epidemic.
There are some cases when parametric tools fortunately work as advertised, such 
as a US$22 million ARC payout to Senegal in November 2019. Yet models and 
triggers for sovereign parametric products thus far appear biased in favour of insurers. 
If basis risk errors were random, the number of ‘downside’ basis risk events should 
roughly equal the number of ‘upside’ events (when an index suggests conditions on 
the ground are worse than they actually are, potentially triggering an excessive payout). 
Yet there is little evidence of upside events. The number and variety of cases in which 
contracts misfire suggest that the turn towards parametric insurance products is not 
consistently reducing uncertainty for Southern governments, or reliably transferring 
it to the private sector. Rather, it may be redistributing the undesirable components 
of uncertainty as basis risk both to those insured and to donor governments, who bear 
the costs when parametric products fail to deliver protection.
While parametrics promise Southern government decision- makers coverage for 
a stated hazard, they also expose them to a new kind of risk. This, in the words of 
a senior risk modelling executive, is ‘the toxic politics of basis risk’ (Muir- Wood 
2017). This is the political liability of spending scarce treasury funds to purchase a 
policy that does not pay out when the government expects it to, or when angry citi-
zens think it should. If fear of basis risk drives enough decision- makers to remove 
their countries from a risk pool – as occurred with ARC following the Malawi 
crisis – this creates cascading doubts for other members about the long- term via-
bility of the pool itself. Uncertainty proliferates.
Technologies of humility?
Given these challenges, one might ask whether it is possible to rescue the promise 
of insurance as a technique of mutual solidarity and sustainable risk- sharing. Can 
parametric insurance arrangements ever reliably reduce uncertainties and secure 
financing for disaster liabilities, as proponents hope? Or are they bound simply to 
pass uncertainties around?
It is possible to imagine insurance otherwise. Here, we might begin our re- 
envisioning with Jasanoff ’s (2003) proposal for new ‘technologies of humility’ in 
policy- making that complement and correct the hazards of technologies of hubris. 
Technologies of humility are ‘institutionalized habits of thought that try to come 
to grips with the ragged fringes of human understanding  – the unknown, the 
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thought acknowledge areas of fundamental uncertainty, the possibility of unfore-
seen consequences and the need for plural viewpoints and collective learning. This 
epistemological disposition is a crucial corrective to technically complex mod-
elling, which by its nature tends to minimise the significance of whatever falls 
outside its field of vision, and overstate the importance of whatever falls within 
it (ibid.: 239). Approaching parametric insurance products from the disposition of 
technological humility yields some unconventional ideas for re- imagining their 
design and function.
Jasanoff suggests four focusing questions we might use to cultivate technologies 
of humility. These are questions that technologies of hubris persistently avoid. Is 
the scope of the problem appropriately framed? Who is vulnerable? What are the dis-
tributive implications? And how should we learn from failure? Let us consider each 
in turn.
Framing: The framing of the ‘global protection gap’ suggests both a problem and 
a solution. If the problem is uninsured losses then the solution that follows is 
extending the reach of insurance tools to new hazards, new geographies and new 
domains of the economy. But, as the law of the instrument holds, ‘to someone 
with a hammer, everything looks like a nail’. If the problems of uninsured losses 
and unassigned contingent liabilities are instead reframed as missing safety nets and 
absent social contracts, the fields of play suddenly become much larger. Questions 
of social protection and democratic governance come into view. Insurance can be 
put into perspective as only a modest and partial solution. Parametric products may 
or may not fulfil a need.
Attention to framing might also lead us to consider whether calling parametric 
products ‘insurance’ is cognitively useful, or instead misleading. Language shapes 
expectations. The term ‘insurance’ connotes a relationship of security and indemni-
fication that parametric products expressly avoid. Calling parametric products ‘insur-
ance’ may downplay the inevitable uncertainty and basis risk they contain. Describing 
them rather as ‘derivatives’ – financial products whose value is based on the behav-
iour of another underlying variable – would make these uncertainties more evi-
dent. At first glance, this might seem a counterintuitive suggestion: derivatives were 
notoriously implicated in the accumulation, packaging and trade of massive mort-
gage debts culminating in the global financial crisis of 2007– 2010. Yet this experi-
ence arguably raised media and political awareness of their prevalence and the risks 
of their use. Unless or until parametric insurance products are systematically quality- 
controlled to track and ensure correspondence between indices and losses, they are 
essentially weather and environmental derivatives. Describing them as such might 
signal their limitations and prompt a healthy new degree of scrutiny over their use.
Vulnerability: We have already seen how the design of parametric products some-
times leaves those insured holding large basis risk. This is the chance that they will 
pay an insurance premium, experience a catastrophic event and then receive no 
payout according to contractual terms. Though basis risk can be reduced through 
careful design, it can never be eliminated. It must be accepted as a corollary of 
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extending insurance arrangements to populations and locales not traditionally 
deemed insurable.
Who, then, is particularly vulnerable to such basis risk? Countries whose 
governments are willing to experiment with the imperfect coverage of parametric 
sovereign insurance contracts tend to be those whose marginal position in the 
global political economy compels them to accept a compromise on terms set by 
global insurers, investors and development banks. Those with limited technical and 
actuarial training are especially vulnerable, as they may not be able to assess fully 
the terms of the coverage offered, and thus may remain unaware of the basis risk 
their treasuries will retain. Building technologies of humility to address such vul-
nerability would minimally require transparent technical and actuarial analysis of 
competing options, advocacy on countries’ behalf with insurance providers, and 
cultivation of regional or country- based networks of expertise. It is critical that 
such a data analytics- intensive technical role be played by parties without any finan-
cial or operational interests in a country’s ultimate risk management choices, unlike 
in today’s model, in which technical expertise flows from reinsurers, reinsurance 
brokers and the World Bank.
Distribution: An obvious question often monitored by donor institutions concerns 
the distribution of insurance payouts. This is in essence a question of auditing who 
receives payouts from insurance policies, and tracking the cost to distribute each 
dollar of aid via this channel as opposed to another, such as cash transfers (Jensen 
et  al. 2017). Although it is indeed critical to understand this, a deeper question 
of distribution remains: where does the bulk of donor funds put into parametric 
insurance ultimately accrue? What is the likelihood of a given donor dollar being 
distributed (in cash or kind) to a vulnerable person, or being retained by an insurer 
or intermediary? When would a contract have paid out for past historical events? 
While historical calibration is often conducted for the purposes of pricing insur-
ance contracts, this information is rarely made public, nor are payout frequencies 
(and their relative costs and trade- offs) subject to public deliberation. An approach 
promoting humility could mandate the standardised disclosure of these distribu-
tional arrangements and facilitate debates over the minimum criteria for publicly- 
subsidised coverage.
Learning: When technological innovations in insurance fail to live up to the 
expectations heaped upon them – as so many technologies inevitably do – a cru-
cial question concerns what and how we can learn from these experiences. When 
predictive models misfire, blame and recrimination typically follow. The opacity or 
transparency with which insurance institutions review and revise models and data 
sources is a critical determinant for (re)building credibility among those insured 
and the public. But there will always be some degree of causal ambiguity, and com-
peting explanations for failure will depend on actors’ positions within the insurance 
relationship.
A better question, then, is not what institutions learn about the shortcomings 
of their models, but rather how basis risk events could galvanise the development 
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of different fora for decision- making that would make parametric insurance more 
adaptive, context- dependent and responsive. This would require letting go of some 
of the persistent impulses towards control that led to the embrace of parametric 
insurance tools in the first place. We might imagine, for instance, fora for partici-
patory deliberation among mutually insured parties about what should constitute 
a basis risk event, or what criteria should be used to reallocate inevitably limited 
indemnification funds to such cases. Such fora would need to be animated by a 
different model of trust than the asymmetric one that characterises typical insurer– 
insured relations, in which those who are insured are asked to place their trust in 
an insurer who expressly doubts the trustworthiness (or wisdom) of those being 
insured. Within participating countries, fora could be established in which civil 
servants, civil society organisations and beneficiaries themselves could deliberate 
over the inevitable trade- offs involved in their country’s selection of particular con-
tractual terms and triggers.
Some will object that this reorientation would undermine the entire ontological 
framework of insurance, based as it is on probabilistic calculation and objective payout 
criteria. Yet the history of insurance in mutuals, friendly societies (Van Leeuwen 
2016; Ismay 2015) – and even commercial reinsurance (Jarzabkowski et al. 2015) – 
demonstrates that more relational and contextual deployments of insurance are pos-
sible, and indeed were the norm for centuries. But these have typically been built on 
more extensive interpersonal ties and expectations of longer- enduring relationships, 
both between members of the risk pool and between insurer and insured.
Despite their promise to extend insurance security to new geographies and 
hazard domains, parametric insurance and ‘insurance- like products’ currently 
suffer from a legitimacy deficit due to the basis risk they transfer to those insured. 
Basis risk needs to be understood not simply as a problem of poor design, but 
as an existential political challenge to the framework of parametric insurance. 
If we are to salvage the value of parametric insurance as a solidaristic tool for 
coping with uncertainties, then we must approach the technology with a dose of 
humility. Parametric insurance could become a far more democratic tool of risk 
governance, building ‘on people’s legitimate expectations of equality, represen-
tation, fairness and public accountability’ (Jasanoff 2010: 29). But this requires a 
radical openness to re- imagining its design and the constituencies to which it is 
accountable – and a willingness to relinquish the illusions of objective control at 
a distance.
Notes
 1 The likes of which are proposed by Clarke and Dercon (2019).
 2 www.africanriskcapacity.org.
 3 However, anthropological accounts of Ebola’s spread in West Africa suggest that funding 
shortfalls were far from the most significant factor in preventing the disease’s containment 
(Erikson 2016; Wilkinson and Leach 2015).
 4 In 2020, this included 76 countries, 39 of which were in Africa (http:// ida.worldbank.
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